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RECENT CASE NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-INJUNCTIONS AGAINST ACTS OF ADmINISTRATIVII
OrFIcmas.-The plaintiff claimed title to a tract of land as a remote grantee
of the state of California. In 1853, by an act of Congress, the government
had granted certain lands to the state, excepting such portions as might
be found of mineral value when the survey was approved. Such approval
was not given until 1903, and in 1914 the federal land office challenged the
plaintiff's title under the exception. The dispute was submitted to the Sec-
retary of the Interior, who decided in favor of the plaintiff. Seven years
latei , the defendant secretary reversed his predecessor's decision and or-
dered a rehearing. The plaintiff obtained a decree enjoining the proceed-
ings, and the defendant appealed. Held, that the decree be affirmed, as the
defendant had no authority to make the order. Work v. Standard Oil Co.,
23 F. (2d) 750 (App. D. C. 1927).
The federal courts refuse to enjoin any discretionary acts of adminis-
trative officers of the federal government. Missisgippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall.
475 (U. S. 1867) ; Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Mellon, 277 Fed. 548 (App.
D. C. 1922) (application of act of Congress as interpreted by the Secretary
of the Treasury); Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 245 Fed. 102 (C. C. A. 2d,
1917) (determination by Postmaster General of seditious character of
matter excluded from mails). But where the act threatened is beyond the
authority of the officer the injunction will be granted. American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23 Sup. Ct. 33 (1902) ; Noble
v. Union River Logging R. R., 147 U. S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271 (1893) (revo-
cation by Secretary of Interior of his predecessor's approval of grant of
right of way); Waite v, Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 38 Sup. Ct. 395 (1918)
(Secretary of Treasury's order of unreasonable test for imported tea).
The theory given is that on exceeding his authority the officer acts in an
individual, not an official capacity. See Hoffman Brewing Co. V. MoElli-
gott, 259 Fed. 525, 527 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919). Therefore, it is never neces-
saiy to make the United States a party to such a suit. Work v. Louisiana,
269 U. S. 250, 46 Sup. Ct. 92 (1925). Where a definite ministerial duty
involving no discretion is imposed upon an officer, a deviation injuriously
affecting private rights may be enjoined. Santa Fe Pac. R. R. v. Fall, 259
U. S. 197, 42 Sup. Ct. 466 (1922); McAdoo v. Ormes, 47 App. D. C. 364
(1918) (payment of claim against United States by Secretary of Treasury
to another than the one entitled thereto) ; Loisel v. Mortimer, 277 Fed. 882
(C. C. A. 5th, 1922) (order of, Comptroller of Treasury withholding part
of the plaintiff's salary payable by act of Congress). So long as the title
to public lands remains in the United States, the courts recognize the juris-
diction of the Department of the Interior and refuse to interfere by man-
damus or injunction. Plested v. Abbey, 228 U. S. 42, 33 Sup. Ct. 503
(1913). But when there has been a grant the tendency is to hold that the
Department no longer has jurisdiction, and that its attempt to revoke a
grant or cast a cloud upon the title is "ultra vires" and should be en-
joined. Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525, 34 Sup. Ct. 965 (1914). Such was
the basis of decision in the instant case. The holding that, in the absence
of fraud, an administrative officer cannot revoke the decision of a pre-
decessor acting within the scope of his authority is undoubtedly sound law.
However, a showing of fraud in the proceedings of 1921 would presumably
have led to a contrary decision. See Dugan v. United States, 34 Ct. Cl.
458, 466 (1899); Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrativo Action
(1921) 35 HARv. L. Rriv. 127, 151; cf. (1927) 37 YALE LAW JOURNAL 255.
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CAnRIERS--RESPONSmILrTY FOR FREIGHT UNDECHGEs.-The defend-
ant domniission merchant, at the direction of the consignee, who was also
the consignor, accepted merchandise shipped under a straight bill of lading,
paying the freight charges demanded. The plaintiff carrier later sued for
freight undercharges. Held (one judge dissenting), that the defendant is
responsible for the balance of charges due according to tariffs filed under
the Interstate Commerce Act. Erie R. R. v. Rosenstdn, 227 N. Y. Supp.
99 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1928).
The purpose of § 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act [49 U. S. Code
Ann. (1927) § 2] was to secure equality of reasonable rates, by forbidding
rebates and prohibiting secret departures from the published rate. See
N. Y., N. H., & H. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Coin., 200 U. S. 31, 391,
26 Sup. Ct. 272, 277 (1906). Carriers are required to exhaust their legal
remedies to collect undercharges from parties responsible therefor. I. C.
C. Conf. Rluling No. 314; Watkins, Shippers and Carriers (3d ed. 1920)
735. Thus an undercharge may be collected from either the consignor or
consignee. N. Y. Cent. R. R. v. Federal Sugar Ref. Co., 235 N. Y. 182,
139 N. E. 234 (1923). The consignor is responsible as a party of the
shipment contract. Central Ry. of N. J. -. McCartney, 08 N. J. L. 105,
52 Atl. 575 (1902); N. Y. Cent. R. R. v. Philadelphia Rcading Coal & Iron
Co., 286 Ill. 267, 121 N. E. 581 (1919). A consignee is not responsible
because of the mere relation of carrier and consignee. Chicago B. & Q. R.
R. v. Evans, 288 S. W. 73 (Mo. App. 1926). But he becomes so upon
accepting delivery of the goods. Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Fink,
250 U. S. 577, 40 Sup. Ct. 27 (1919). N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. v. York,
256 U. S. 406, 41 Sup. Ct. 509 (1921). Even though assured by the carrier,
before acceptance, that all charges are fully paid, the carrieris not estopped
to recover as this would result in indirect discrimination. Dircctor Gcn.
R. R. v. McCornack 136 Atl. 253 (N. H, 1927); Great Northcrn Ry. v.
Hyder, 279 Fed. 733 (W. D. Wash. 1922). A pledgee of an order bill of
lading, ordering delivery, with instructions to collect from the pledgor, is
responsible. Dare v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 20 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
But the "party" under a "notify party" straight bill of lading who
ordered delivery to another on payment of freight is not responsible. N.
Y. Cent. R. R. v. Sharp, 124 Misc. 265, 206 N. Y. Supp. 755 (Sup.
Ct. 1924). Neither a consignee, nor his vendee accepting delivery is
responsible where the consignor is on the carrier's "credit list" and bill of
lading is marked "prepaid." Cinclnnati Northern R. R. v. BEvcridge, S F.
(2d) 372 (E. D. Va. 1925). That the consignee is acting only as an agcnt,
does not protect him. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Tits, 216 N. Y. 17, 109 N.
E. 857 (1915) (commission merchant who had remitted proceeds to his
consignor). This is so even though the agency relationship was kmown to
the carrier. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Chappell & Co., 215 Ala. 31, 109 So.
574 (1926); Western & Atl. R. R. v. Underwood, 281 Fed. 891 (N. D. Ga.
1922) (designated "agent" in bill of lading). This disregard of ordinary
rules of agency, in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute, obviously
has worked individual hardships. Congress, apparently, has recognized
this in providing that a consignee, acting as an agent only, by giving
written notice of such to the carrier before delivery may be absolved
from all responsibility for undercharges. 49 U. S. Code Ann. (1927) § 3,
par. 2, as amended Mar. 4, 1927. The instant case extends responsibility
to the agent of a consignee, and approves a dictum that anyone who for
any reason pays the charges demanded, inducing the carrier to deliver
the goods, should be held responsible for an undercharge. See N. Y. Cent.
R. R. v. Sharp, supra. The necessity or desirability of doing so seems
questionable.
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CONTRACTS-OPTIONS-WHEN PERSONAL.,-In a lease of realty to A & B,
the defendant, for a sufficient named consideration, granted them an "op-
tion or right to buy' property. The sale was to be partially on credit,
the notes and mortgage to be signed by A & B. A died. His executor
and B together filed a bill for specific performance of the option on credit.
A demurrer to the bill was overruled. Held, on appeal, that the decree
for the plaintiff be reversed, as the option was personal to A & B and
terminated on the death of A. Frissel v. Nichols, 114 So. 431 (Fla. 1927).
Ordinarily, in the absence of stipulation, options are assignable. Tan-
trum v. Keller, 95 N. J. Eq. 466, 123 Atl. 299 (1924); Chesbrough V. VYiz-
ar'd Inv. Co., 156 Ky. 149, 160 S. W. 725 (1913). Contra: Reese v. Iattlo,
56 W. Va. 269, 49 S. E. 150 (1904). And pass by devolution to the personal
representative. McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257, 41 Atl. 840
(1898); Walker v. Bradley, 89 Misc. 516, 153 N. Y. Supp. 686 (Sup.
Ct. 1915). But it has been held to pass to the heirs. Prout v. Robey, 15
Wall. 471 (U. S. 1872); Henrihan v. Gallagher, 9 Grant Ch. (U. C.) 488
(1862). But ef. Newton v. Newton, 11 R. 1. 390 (1876) (passed to neither).
The option may be non-assignable by express words. Meyer v. Stone, 128
Iowa 10, 102 N. W. 507 (1905) (to optionee "but to no other person").
So, too, if it is embodied in a lease containing a covenant against assign-
ment. Pritchard v. Kimball, 190 Cal. 757, 214 Pac. 863 (1923); Behrun v.
Claudy, 50 Wash. 400, 97 Pac. 450 (1908). A judgment lien on a leasehold
does not allow the ienor to exercise an option in the. lease. Sweezy V.
Jones, 65 Iowa 273 (1884). Nor will an option pass under foreclosure
of a mortgage on a lease-hold. Conn v. Tonner, 86 Iowa 577 (1892). But
cf. Louisville Bank v. Baumeister, 87 Ky. 6, 7 S. W. 170 (1888). An option
to buy on credit has been held personal to the optionee. Menger V. Ward,
87 Tex. 622, 30 S. W. 853 (1895); Macon Auto Co. v. Heard, 142 Ga. 264,
82 S. E. 658 (1914). But when given to A and B and A assigns to B, B
may accept by paying cash. Pearson v. Millard, 150 N. C. 303, 63 S. E.
1053 (1909). An option to purchase on credit is terminated by the death
of the optionee. Sims v. Cordele Ice Co., 119 Ga. 597, 46 S. E. 841 (1904).
But of. Ankeny v. Richardson, 187 Fed. 550 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911) (covenants
in lease to bind heirs and personal representatives; heirs allowed to pur-
chase on credit, no requirement that notes be signed by original optionee).
The instant decision, holding an option to sell on credit personal to the
optionee; seems desirable because the credit of the latter alone was con-
templated and bargained for. His personal representative with the surviv-
ing optionee might seem entitled to specific performance upon tender of
the full purchase price. But query whether this 'is too substantial an
alteratiori of the optionor's contract?
CONTRACTS-IMPLIED CONDITION TO PAY WITHIN A REASONABLE TIm,-
EFFECT OF STATUTE OF LImITATIONS.-The plaintiff made loans to her sister,
to be repaid when the latter should sell her house, which was finally dis-
posed of eight years later by the defendant administrator, after the sister's
death. In an action on the debt, the court construed the agreement as one
to pay within a reasonable time, found to be from three to six months, and
held, that the cause of action was therefore barred by the Statute of Limi-
tations. On appeal, the judgment was reversed (two judges dissenting)
on the ground that the statute would not begin to run until the house was
sold. Link v. Hill, 159 N. E. 573 (Ohio St. 1927).
In general, provisions similar to that of the instant case are interpreted
as implying an alternative promise to pay within a reasonable time should
the contingency not occur. Hicks v. Shouse, 17 B. Mon. 483 (Ky. 1856)
(to pay when house should be sold); Greenstreet v. Cheatum, 99 Kan. 290,
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161 Pac. 596 (1916) (same); Pegg v. Olsen, 31 Wyo. 96, 2.3 Pac. 223
(1924) ("Until you succeed in negotiating a loan"); Lewis v. Tipton, 10
Ohio St. 88 (1859) ("When I can make it convenient"); Ban que Rutcso-
Asiatique v. Dolch, 3 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) (employee's salary
payable when employer resumed business). But slightly different provi-
sions may be strictly enforced as conditions precedent Second Nat. Bant:
of Cincinnati v. Pan-American Bridge Co., 183 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 0th, 1910)
(architect's certificate); Fox v. Commcrcial Press Co., 28 Ky. L. R. 44,
88 S. W. 1063 (1905) (to deliver newspaper as long as the company con-
tinued publication); Pfanz v. Humbcrg, 82 Ohio St. 1, 91 N. E. 803 (1910)
(real estate agent to be paid when house was sold). The effect of the
implied promise to pay within a reasonable time is to assure the creditor
his recovery. But when the Statute of Limitations is involved the same
implication has been held to bar the creditor's action, brought after the
sale, inasmuch as the statutory period, commencing after a "reasonable"
time, may have expired. Wrighb v. Hull, 83 Ohio St. 385, 94 N. E. 813
(1911). The instant case distinguishes Wright v,. Hull, svpra, on the
ground of the "intent of the parties." The court considered the family
relationship and the decedent's pecuniary embarrassment as showing an
intent that the payments be made from the proceeds of the sale and not
necessarily within a reasonable time, thus avoiding what appears to be
an undesirable precedent. Courts may refuse to enforce certain provisions
in order to prevent a forfeiture. Livcrpool and London Ins. Co. v. Kcarney,
180 U. S. 132, 21 Sup. Ct. 326 (1901); 2 Williston, Contracts (1920) §§
793, 806, 807. It is submitted that they might well recognize a provision
to pay on the happening of a contingency as a condition precedent in order
to prevent a forfeiture under the Statute of Limitations.
CONTRACTS-PAYMENTS OF OVERDUE INSTALLMENTS DEPENDENT ON CON-
VEYANCE-In a contract for the sale of real estate the defendant gave a
check in part payment of the purchase price, the remainder to be paid on
delivery of the deed. Learning of an incumbrance on the use of the prem-
ises, he stopped payment on the check. After the day set for conveyance,
the plaintiff brought suit on the check, not having removed the incumbrance
or tendered a deed. Judgment was for the defendant. Held, on appeal (one
judge dissenting), that the judgment be affirmed on the ground that after
the date set for delivery of the deed, the defendant's obligation on the pay-
ment of the check became dependant on the conveyance of a good title by
the plaintiff. Kennelly v. Shapiro, 226 N. Y. Supp. 692 (App. Div. 1st
Dept. 1928).
When a deed to real estate is to be given upon payment of the last in-
stallment of the purchase price the vendor without tender of performance
on his part may enforce the payment of any of the earlier installments prior
to the due date of the last. See Stevens ',. Irwin, 132 Wash. 289, 291, 231
Pac. 783, 784 (1925); Strauss v. Ycager, 48 Ind. App. 448, 450, 93 N. E.
877, 881 (1911) (vendor need not at this time be in possession of the title).
But after the last payment is due the vendor may not recover any of the
earlier installments without averring performance or an offer to perform
on his part. McCroskey v. Ladd, 96 Cal. 455, 31 Pac. 558 (1892); see
Ewing v. Wightrman, 167 N. Y. 107, 110, 60 N. E. 322, 323 (1901). On
the other hand, a few courts have held that the buyer's payment of the
earlier installments is wholly independent and remains so even after de-
fault by the vendor. McMath v. Johnson, 41 Miss. 439 (1807) ; Gray v.
Meek, 199 Ill. 136, 64 N. E. 1020 (1902); see Walker v. Hcvitt, 109 Or.
366, 380, 220 Pac. 147, 152 (1923). Where no date is Eet for delivery of the
deed, some courts have construed the agreement of sale to allow recovery
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by the vendor of all the installments without tender of a deed. Loud 'V.
Pomona Land and Water Go., 153 U. S. 564, 14 Sup. Ct. 928 (1894);
Shenners v. Pritchard, 104 Wis. 287, 80 N. W. 458 (1889). This view is
not generally approved. 2 Williston, Contracts (1920) § 837. Under the
facts of the instant case, as the vendor cannot perform according to his
promise, the decision denying him recovery of any part of the purchase
price seems desirable.
DAMIAGEs-PERnAISSIVE WASTE-RECOVERY UNDER STATUTE .- The defend-
ant leased hotel property from the plaintiff, and permitted the premises
to fall into a state of disrepair. In an action for permissive waste, the
lower court granted treble damages under a statute providing for such a
remedy [4 N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) 5790]. Held, on appeal, that the
proper interpretation of the statute does not justify the addition of treble
damages for permissive waste. Smith v. Salvation Army, 140 At. 298
( N. J. L. 1928).
At early common law recovery for waste was usually limited to the
actual damage. Kirchwey, Liability for Waste (1908) 8 CoL. L. RIv.
425, 433. The Statute of Gloucester provided for forfeiture and treble
damages. (1278) 6 Edw. I, c. 5. See Moore v. Townshend, 33 N. J. L.
284, 300 (1869). This statute was designed as a punitive measure for the
preservation of feudal estates and the prevention of the then prevalent
waste. See Parker v. Chamblisg, 12 Ga. 235, 237 (1852) ; Kirchwey, op. cit.
supra, at 433. It contemplated both permissive and voluntary waste. Co.
LITT. * 53. See Green v. Cole, 2 Saunders 252 (1671) note. In 1879 the
statute was repealed and superseded by an action on the case for waste,
which relieved the tenant of such burdensome penalties. (1879) 42 Vict. c.
59; 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1912) § 109. In the United States,
most jurisdictions rejected the Statute of Gloucester as not "applicable to
our conditions and circumstances," and so not part of our common law. See
Woodward v. Gates, 38 Ga. 205, 212 (1868); Blake v. Hoover Motor Co.,
28 N. M. 371, 374, 212 Pac. 738, 738 (1923). But see Thurston v. Mustin,
'Fed. Cas. No. 14,013, 1176, 1178 (1827). But many states have re-enacted
the statute or adopted it in modified form. Stimson, American Statute Law
(1886) §§ 1332, 1343. Certain of these statutes make the granting of
treble damages discretionary. Isom v. Book, 142 Cal. 666, 76 Pac. 506
(1904) ; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (1923). § 732 ("may" be responsible in treble
damages). Others have been construed to contemplate only voluntary
waste. Smith v. Mattingly, 96 Ky. 228, 28 S. W. 503 (1894). Some courts
appear to grant the enhanced damages only where the waste is wilful and
wanton. See Delano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 47, 244 Pac. 273, 276
(1926). The court in the instant case, refusing to allow treble damages
for permissive waste, is in accord with the tendency to limit the applica-
tion of antiquated statutes which are of questionable value under modern
conditions.
EQUITY-INJUNCTION-SEIZURE OF FIGHT FmLs.-A Federal statute
prohibits the interstate transportation of prize-fight films (18 U. S. C. A.
§ 405-407). The complainant theatre-operator possessed, in California, films
of an Illinois fight. Federal officials threatened to seize them. A bill was
brought to restrain the seizure, alleging that the Federal officers were
without authority since the films had not been brought into the state
through interstate commerce, but had been printed wholly within the state.
Held, that the restraining order be denied. Cullen v. Esola, 21 F. (2d) 877
(N. D. Cal. 1927).
The Federal statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of prize-
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fight films has been upheld as constitutional. Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S.
325, 36 Sup. Ct. 131 (1915). But the extent to which the act authorized
the Federal authorities to interfere with the ex:hibition of such films seems
never to have been decided until after the Dempsey-Tunney fight in Septem-
ber, 1927. At that time local Federal officers were ordered to seize all
films found in their districts. Attempts to compel the return of films after
seizure were generally unsuccessful where there was any evidence to sup-
port a charge of a violation of the statute or a conspiracy to do so. In 70
Film of Dernpsey-Tunney Fight, 22 F. (2d) 837 (N. D. Ga. 1927);
Atlanta Enterprises v. Crawford, 22 F. (2d) 834 (N. D. Ga. 1927). And
even where there was no such evidence at least one court refused to decree
the return of the films. U. S. v. Wilso?, 23 F. (2d) 112 (N. D. W. Va.
1927). The theory of the latter decision, as in the instant case, was that
mere possession of films, outside the state in which the fight took place
gave rise to a presumption that the possessor had been a party to the
violation of the statute, and that, so long as such a possibility e:dsted, equity
should not interfere with the criminal proceedings. Other court-, however,
have rejected this reasoning and have protected the possession of films
-where the possessor -was not shown to have had any part in the interstate
transportation. Consolidated Amuscients, Inc. 'v. Gobcr, 22 F. (2d) 296
(S. D. Fla. 1927) (preliminary injunction granted against seizure); cf.
New York Times, Oct. 21, 1927, at 25 (reply of Goddard, J., (S. D. New
York) to questions of Federal Grand Jury). One consideration that has
influenced some courts to this attitude is the irreparable damage caused by
seizure due to the time element in the value of films. Cf. New Hatcn
Journal-Co-ier, Oct. 20, 1927, at 1 (temporary restraining order by Thom-
as, 5. (D. Conn.) in Gross v. Buckl y.) It would seem that the conflicting
attitudes of the courts are due fundamentally to differing opinions as to
the desirability of enforcing the statute. There is a strong feeling current
that this statute has outlived its usefulness, as it was largely designed to
prevent racial enmity and was passed at a time when public opinion was
generally opposed to prize-fighting. See 48 Cong. Rce. 8236, 9305, 9307
(1912). In view of the present day circulation of the detailed accounts
through the newspapers and the radio, as well as the large attendance at
the fights themselves, the attempts to enforce the statute have placed the
Federal officials in an awkward position. Cf. The Fight over the Fight
Films, 95 Literary Digest, Oct. 29, 1927, at 16. Perhaps these reasons
account for the seeming inactivity of Federal officers in respect to the
fight films which have been widely exhibited in the last few months.
EVIDENcE-HEARsAY-ADAIIssIBILiTy BEFORE ADmvNIsTvnTnv BOAuias.-
The plaintiff seekiig admission to the United States as the son of a Chinese
citizen of this country was held for deportation by immigration authorities
upon evidence of previous statements by the alleged father that he had
only one son, now dead. The district court denied his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that the admission of such evidence was
not arbitrary. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, since the
hearsay rule is inapplicable in hearings before immigration authorities.
Moy Said Ching v. Tillingast, 21 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927).
As in the instant case, the courts have generally allowed the immigration
commissioners to consider any evidence seemingly worthy of credit. United
States v. Uld, 215 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; White v. Chan Wy Shuing,
270 Fed. 764 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921) ; Johnson v. Kock Shing, 3 F. (2d) 889
(C. C. A. 1st, 1924). The same rule is followed by the Board of General
Appraisers. In re Muser, 49 Fed. 831 (C. C. N. Y. 1S92) ; Standard Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Leslie, 78 Fed. 325 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897). The practice of the
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Federal Trade Commission is not to exclude evidence on the ground that
it is technically incompetent. See Henderson, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion (1924) 64. And the courts hold that it is not error for the commis-
sion to consider hearsay evidence. Ark. Wholesale Ass'n, v. Fed. Trade
Comm., 18 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; see Hills Bros. v. Fed. Trade
Comm., 9 F. (2d) 481, 484 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). Hearsay is admitted to
some slight extent by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Spiller v.
Ateheson, T. & S. F. R. R., 253 U. S. 117 (1920) (not objected to and cor-
roborated by competent evidence). But in general it may not be considered.
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Director General, 89 I. C. C. Rep. 154 (1924);
Knight-Luttrell Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line R. R., 120 I. C. C. Rep. 580
(1926). Proceedings before the Board of Tax Appeals are conducted in
accordance with rules applicable in District of Columbia courts of equity.
(1926) 44 Stat. 107. Consequently the "hearsay rule" is applied with cer-
tain exceptions. See Hamel, U. S. Board of Tax Appeals (1926) c. 7.
In compensation cases the rule varies. See Note (1922), 36 HARV. L.
REV. 79. In such cases hearsay is admissable if there is other competent
corroborative evidence. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 217 Ky. 103, 288
S. W. 1057 (1926); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm., 260 P. 354 (Cal. App. 1927); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v.
Knouff, 297 S. W. 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). But hearsay alone will not
sustain an award. Brewerton Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 324 Ill. 89, 154
N. E. 412 (1926); Swim v. Central Fuel Co., 215 N. W. 603 (Iowa, 1927);
Strout's Case, 140 Atl. 377 (Me. 1928). The technical rules as to admissi-
bility are primarily designed only for trials by a jury. See Thayer, Pre-
liminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) c. 12. Therefore, it would seem that
the rule in the instant case could well be adopted in hearings before admin-
istrative boards often composed of experts presumably able to consider the
relative merits of any evidence offered.
HUSBAND AND VIFE-DIvOncE---POWER OF" COURT TO EXTEND ALIMONY
BEYOND HUSBAND'S LIFETIME.-In a divorce decree, in accordance with an
agreement of the parties, the husband was ordered to insure his life as
security for payments of alimony. His petition to vacate the decree on' the
ground that the court was without jurisdiction to order payment after his
death was dismissed. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed on
the ground that although the Massachusetts courts had refused to allow
such an extension where the decree was silent on the subject, there was
no bar to an express award, where, as here, the court had jurisdiction over
the parties who had agreed on the amount and extent of the alimony.
Southard v. Southard, 159 N. E. 512 (Mass. 1928).
There are many dicta to the effect that a wife's right to future alimony
necessarily terminates at her husband's death. See Stone v. Duffy, 219
Mass. 178, 182, 106 N. E. 595, 596 (1914); Lally v. Lally, 152 Wis. 56, 59,
138 N. W. 651, 653 (1913). The rule seems to have been developed under
the ecclesiastical divorce a mensa et there where the claim to alimony was
terminated at the husband's death by allowing the wife a share in his
estate. See Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 420, 221 S. W. 1066, 1068
(1920) (such alimony dependent on husband's duty to support wife); of.
Henrie v. Henrie, 71 W. Va. 131, 76 S. E. 837 (1912) (improper in such
a divorce to award alimony for "natural life" of wife, because she would
receive distributive share in estate at time of husband's death). Today a
divorce is more apt to be a permanent separation, and alimony may be
regarded as a contract right acquired by the wife in consideration for the
relinquishment of all claims against the husband's estate. Barnes v, Klug,
129 App. Div. 192, 113 N. Y. Supp. 325 (1908) (separation agreement with
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terms of alimony included); Parker v. Parker, 193 Cal. 478, 225 Pac. 447
(1924) (parties consenting to alimony award). Where the decree is silent
on the subject of continuance after the husband's death, some states will
allow continuance if such was the "intent" of the parties as shown in their
alimony agreement. Storey v. Storey, 125 IlL 603, 18 N. E. 329 (18838)
(such "intent" found where alimony was to last as long as wife remained
sole); but see Parsons v. Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921)
(citing the Storey case, but failing to find "intent" on identical facts). By
analogy, the contract theory would seem to afford a basis for supporting
a claim by the wife's administrator against the husband where alimony
in gross has been awarded. Hagerty v. Hagcrty, 222 Mich. 160, 192 N. W.
553 (1923); Moore v. Cratchfield, 136 Va. 20, 116 S. E. 482 (1923); Leut-
singer v. McNeely, 273 S. W. 241 (Mlo. 1925). Contra: Buffington v. Cook.,
147 Ga. 681, 95 S. E. 214 (1918). Even in the absence of a consent agree-
ment from which a "contract," for purposes of survival, can be implied,
alimony has been awarded to continue after the husband's death. Burr v.
Burr, 10 Paige 20 (N. Y. 1842) (husband had wasted wife's fortune).
LEGAL AxALss-INsvnAxcE-WAmi -Under a twenty-year life policy
the insured was to select, sixty days prior to the end of the term, one of
three options as to the application of the final dividend, "otherwise the
apportioned accumulations will be applied in accordance with the third
option," extending the insurance. He failed to act within the prescribed
period, but on the company's writing him that his privilege still existed
he demanded the cash settlement provided under the first option. He died
before surrendering the policy as required. His executrix recovered in an
action for the extended insurance under the third option, the company
claiming that the insured had elected the first option. Held, on appeal,
that the judgmenb be reversed on the ground that the company was not
responsible under the third option, having extended the insured's power of
election which he had properly exercised in demanding the cash surrender
value of the policy. State Ins. Co. v. Finncy, 114 So. 132 (Ala. 1927).
By using the loose term "waiver" the court seems to have confused the
instant situation with that where an insurer "waives" the power of extin-
guishing a policy on default in payment of premiums; in such a case no
consideration is necessary. Washburn v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143
Ala. 485, 38 So. 1011 (1905). If the court's analogy is correct, the company
"waived" the "forfeiture" of the first option of the insured, which had not
been extinguished but had merely become "voidable" at the election of the
insurer. Cf. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Lahr, 192 Ind. 013, 137 N. E. 673
(1923) (after waiver of forfeiture of voidable policy, power of election
exercised, therefore "voidable"). Stated differently, the company's liabil-
ity under the first option became subject to its own power of disaffirmance,
which it did not exercise. But if it was extinguished a new consideration
would have been necessary to recreate it. See Imp. Fire Ilns. Co. v. Dun-
ham, 117 Pa. 460, 473, 12 Atl. 668, 673 (1S8). The policy as the exprez-
sion of the intention of the parties, appears to give the insured a power
of election which would be automatically determined on a certain date,
and would not become merely "voidable." 'ere an insured on default in
payment of premiums has an election between several "non-forfeiture" op-
tions, it is usually held that the power of election is extinguished at the
end of the limitation period. Blume v. Pittsb.rg Life & T. Co., 263 Ill.
160, 104 N. E. 1031 (1914); 51 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1044 (1914) annotation.
An option to buy real estate is extinguished and does not become "voidable"
when the time limit expires. Broadwell v. Smith, 152 Ga. 1G1, 103 S. E. 609
(1921). A proper waiver is the giving up a power and privilege to declare
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a contract duty extinguished on the breach of a condition, and no considera-
tion is necessary therefor. See Vance, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance
Law (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL 834, 848. In the instant case, it would
seem, the company gave up no such power. The company offered to substi-
tute the duty which would have been created by an exercise of the first
option for the duty which had been created by the exercise of the third
option. The extinguishment of the latter duty could only be accomplished
by an "executed" contract, i. e. an accord and satisfaction. In the instant
case the insurance company only offered to substitute the new duty, hence
at most it was an offer of an accord and satisfaction, and as such inopera-
tive.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-EFFECT OF DISABILITY OF ALIEN ENEmY.-Tho
plaintiff, a resident of Germany, instituted a suit on a cause of action which
had accrued prior to the world war. The defendant set up the Statute
of Limitations. Judgment was given for the plaintiff. On appeal, held
(two judges dissenting), that the judgment be reversed, on the ground that
the Civil Practice Act § 27, providing that when an alien enemy is under
a disability to sue in the New York courts the period of disability may be
deducted from the statutory period, is modified by § 28, which provides
that the disability must exist when the right accrues. Nathan v. Equitable
Trust Co., 222 App. Div. 389, 226 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dept. 1928).
It is a general rule that after the statute of limitations has commenced
to run, a subsequent disability will have no operative effect. Bowcn v.
Black, 170 Ark. 237, 279 S. W. 782 (1926) (infancy); Richards v. Page Inv.
Co., 112 Or. 507, 228 Pac. 937 (1924) (insanity); Cawood v. Middleton,
202 Ky. 745, 261 S. NV. 242 (1924) (coverture); 1 Wood, Limitations (4th
ed. 1916) § 6. But a well recognized exception exists in the Federal courts,
even in the absence of statute, when an alien enemy is disabled from suing.
Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532 (U. S. 1868); Borovitz v. American Hard
Rubber Co., 287 Fed. 368 (N. D. Ohio, 1923); see Semmcs v. Hartford In-
surance Co., 13 Wall. 158, 160 (U. S. 1872) ; 40 STAT. 41 (1917), U. S. CoPiw.
STAT. (Supp. 1919) § 3115'A-dd, annotation. England, however, probably
does not recognize this exception. 2 Westlake, International Law (1913)
152 n.; Phillipson, Effect of War on Contracts (1909) 75. Statutes in
many states are in substantially the same form as that of § 27 of the New
York Civil Practice Act. Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 260, § 8; Mich. Comp.
Laws (1915) § 12326; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1922) § 2534; Utah Comp. Laws
(1917) § 6483; Wood, op. cit. supra § 242. Under such a statute, on facts
similar to those of the instantcase, a state court has held that the disability
arising subsequent to the accrual of the cause of action may be deducted
from the statutory period. Platz v. Int. Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213
Pac. 187 (1922). The decision of the majority in the instant case literally
follows § 28 of the Civil Practice Act. But the court might have adopted
the view of the dissent and taken the disability of the alien enemy out of
the statute, thus conforming to the prevailing law.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDINANCE ChIANGIIN(G
STREET NAMES AND HOUSE Nu B1Es.-Park Avenue, in New York City, a
residential street named for the park spaces along its center line, originally
terminated at 34th street. Its continuation southward was known as
Fourth Avenue, a business street with a trolley line. Pursuant to the
power granted by the city charter "to regulate the numbering of houses
,* . and the naming of streets," the Board of Aldermen passed an
ordinance extending Park Avenue from 34th to 32d Street, and directing
the defendant borough president to renumber the buildings in the added
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portion. No. 1 Park Avenue, which had long been the address of the
plaintiff's residence, was assigned to a new business building occupying
space once designated 461-477 Fourth Avenue, whose owner then styled
itself the One Park Avenue Corporation. At the suit of the plaintiff, the
lower court enjoined the change as arbitrary and of no public benefit.
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed, since the court had no
power to pass upon the reasonableness of the ordinance. Bacon v. Milkr,
247 N. Y. 311, 160 N. E. 381 (1928).
It is generally held that courts may set aside a municipal ordinance as
unreasonable if it is passed under a general or implied grant of legislative
power, but not where the authority for its enactment is explicit. Matter
of Stubbe v. Adamson, 220 N. Y. 459, 116 N. E.,372 (1917); EX parte
Noyd, 48 Nev. 120, 227 Pac. 1020 (1924); Nature's Rival Co. v. Chicago,
324 fll. 566, 155 N. E. 356 (1927). On the latter ground, courts have de-
clined to interfere with changes in street names, though made contrary to
the wishes of the abutting owners and without a showing of public benefit.
Darling v. Jersey City, 80 N. J. L. 514, 78 AtI. 10 (1910), af'd 84 N. J. L.
758, 86 Atl. 1102 (1913); Eldridge v. Fawcett, 128 Wash. 615, 223 Pac.
1040 (1924). Similarly, the New York court has refused to review the
soundness of a decision by the board of estimate, under express power
from the city charter, changing the grade of a street. McCabe v. City of
New York, 213 N. Y. 463, 107 N. E. 1049 (1915). Where courts have en-
joined changes in street names as arbitrary, the authority for the change
was at most uncertain. Anderson. v. Dublin, 15 L. R. Ir. 410 (1885);
Miller v. Cincinnati, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 423 (Super. Ct. 1889). It has,
however, been held that any municipal ordinance may be set aside on a
showing of fraud actually consummated. 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations
(5th ed. 1911) § 580. And, where property rights are involved, on the
constitutional ground that it is an unreasonable exercise of the police
power. People v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17 (1909); City of
Hammond v. Calumet Coal Co., 262 Fed. 938 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920). Such
relief in the instant case seems unavailable, since there appears to be no
property interest in the address of a dwelling. Cf. Day v. Browurlgg, 10
Ch. D. 294 (1873). But, on the analogy of a trade mark, the appropriation
of a business address by a competitor has been enjoined. Glen & Hall Alfg.
Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226 (1874). And it seems that the latter interest
should be similarly protected though the appropriation were attempted
through the medium of a board of aldermen. But cf. Van Ingen v. Huid-
son Realty Co., 106 App. Div. 444, 94 N. Y. Supp. 645 (1st Dept. 1905).
NEGLIGENCE-RAILROADS-DUTY TO GInE MoRE TuN STALTUTORY SIGNALS
AT GRADE CROSSrnG-The plaintiff's son, riding in a bus on a foggy day,
was struck and killed by the defendant's train at an open country grade
crossing. There was evidence that the engineer had given the signals re-
quired by statute. In a death damage suit, the trial court instructed the
jury that the defendant was under a duty to use reasonable care, and that,
even if the statutory signals had been given, they might find the defendant
negligent in not taking added precautions in view of the weather condi-
tions. Held, on appeal, that this instruction was erroneous; that, unless
the crossing is in itself peculiarly dangerous, the statute defines the degree
of cdre necessary, and that unusual weather conditions at an ordinary
crossing do not raise a greater duty. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Stegaman, 2
F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927).
The principal case is founded on a precedent in the same court holding
that, unless the crossing be in itself peculiarly dangerous, the statute de-
fines the care required. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Recves, 10 F. (2d) 329
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(C. C. A. 6th, 1926) (grade crossing accident under adverse weather con-
ditions).; of. Chicago, I. & L. R. R. v. American Trust Co., 85 Ind. App.
193, 153 N. E. 419 (1926). The general tendency of courts, however,
seems to be to hold that in any case it is a jury question whether, in view
of the circumstances, giving the statutory signals is reasonable care, i. V.,
that the statute only sets a minimum. Elgin J. & E. R. R. v. Lawlor, 229
Ill. 621, 82 N. E. 407 (1907). This rule was apparently adopted in the
earlier federal cases. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Miller, 99 Fed. 529 (C. C. A.
3d, 1900). When the crossing is peculiarly dangerous, courts generally
leave the question of reasonable care to the jury. Erie R. R. v. Weinstein,
166 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 6th,, 1909) (blizzard, and obstruction of view of
street by building); Ward v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 311 Mo. 92, 277 S. W.
908 (1925) (jury question whether statutory speed of train was negligent
at obstructed crossing). The view that it is entirely a question for the
jury whether the statutory signals or speed are reasonable may lead to
the extreme of requiring such caution as virtually to disrupt train service.
Cf. Hines v. Beasley, 17 Ala. App. 636, 88 So. 31 (1920) (on foggy day
engineer must run so slowly as to be able to stop within distance he can
see). It would seem more desirable to hold that the statutory signals are
a minimum, sufficient unless the court find evidence of such unusual circum-
stances to warrant leaving it to the jury to require greater care. It seems
that a heavy fog, as in the instant case, is such an unusual circumstance as
to require a standard of care higher than that of the statute.
PLEADING-CONSOLIDATION OF AcTioNS.-Two actions for deceit brought
against the same defendant by different plaintiffs because of false repre-
sentations made by different issues of the same prospectus, and by different
agents, were consolidated under the New York Civil Practice Act, § 96.
Held, on appeal (two judges dissenting), the consolidation was within the
discretion of the trial court, since there was no prejudice to a substantial
right, regardless of whether a joinder of parties or causes of action under
the Civil Practice Act, §§ 209, 258 would have been permitted. Crandall v.
Leach & Co., 222 App. Div. 292, 225 N. Y. Supp. 649 (4th Dept. 1927).
Although consolidation is used in the sense of merely holding a case on
the docket until another is terminated, or of the trial of two cases together
without changing their identity, technical consolidation is the combining
of several actions into a single one wherein a single judgment is rendered.
Ross v. Fox, 212 Ky. 838, 280 S. W. 143 (1926) (suspending action);
Azinger v. Pa. R. R., 262 Pa. 242, 105 Atl. 87 (1918) (trial of separate
suits together) ; Coli v. Coliri, 254 Mass. 488, 150 N. E. 323 (1926) (tech-
nical consolidation); Clark, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action
(1927) 25 MICH. L. REv. 393, 429. In the absence of statute, courts have
power to consolidate law actions, even where different plaintiffs are in-
volved. Central States Gas Co. v. Parker-Russell Mining and Mfg. Co.,
196 Ind. 163, 142 N. E. 119 (1924) (foreclosure of mechanics' liens);
Kenalos v. H. V. Greene Co., 128 Atl. 335 (N. H. 1925) (recovery by dif-
ferent plaintiffs for money subscribed for shares issued unlawfully). Most
statutes and codes require either the same parties or such parties as could
originally have been joined. Ga. Code (1910) § 5520; Thompson v. Buico,
162 Ga. 556, 134 S. E. 303 (1926) (same parties); Okla. Rev. Laws (1921)
§ 324; Winemiller v. Stewart, 257 Pac. 288 (Okla. 1927) (plaintiffs requir-
ing judgment in alternative-could not have been joined originally); N. Y.
Code of Civ. Proc. (1920) § 817; Martin v. Prentice, 133 App. Div. 741,
118 N. Y. Supp. 215 (1st Dept. 1909) (must have been same plaintiff and
same defendant); Clark, op. cit. supra, at 430 (other code citations). The
N. Y. Civil Practice Act, § 96 allows consolidation wherever it will not im-
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pair a substantial right. An interpretation different from the instant case
has held that where the causes of action could not be joined under the Civil
Practice Act § 258, there could not be consolidation. Brody v. Madkson
Lunch, 199 App. Div. 640, 192 N. Y. Supp. 10 (2nd Dept. 1922); but cf.
Goldey v. Bierman, 201 App. Div. 527, 194 N. Y. Supp. 373 (1st Dept.
1922); see Rothschild, Siniplification of Ciril Practice in Ncw 1' or: (1923)
23 COL. L. REv. 618, 637. The policy indicated by the instant case is in
accord with the purpose of the section and avoids the unfortunate results
of the restrictions on joinder of actions. The Court of Appeals has allowed
joinder of parties, as not interfering with the constitutional right to trial
by jury in spite of differences in individual issues. Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238
N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924) ; see Comment (1924) 34 YL LAW Join-
NAL 192. As was emphasized by the dissent, the greater dissimilarity in
the issues in the instant care as compared with the Kinnicutt case, give-
perhaps less justification for regarding the test for joinder of parties, i. c.,
"a common question of law or fact:' satisfied. But there was no greater
impairment of the right of jury trial than in the Kinnicutt case.
PLEADING-SEPARATE INJURIES FRO WRONGFUL ACr AS ONE CAUSE OF
AcTroN.The plaintiff instituted separate suits for the loss of his wife's
services and for his own personal injuries, both having been injured by
the same negligent act of the defendant. The plaintiff having recovered
in the former action, the defendant entered a plea of former adjudication
which was upheld by the trial court. Held, on appeal, that judgment be
affirmed since the negligent act gave rise to but one cause of action which
cannot be split into several suits. Johnston v,. Southcrn By., 299 S. W.
785 (Tenn. 1927).
On similar facts separate actions have been permitted. Skoglund v.
Minn. St. Ry., 45 "Ainn. 330, 47 N. W. 1071 (1891) ; Texas & Pac. By. T.
Nelson, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 156, 29 S. W. 78 (1894). A wife having recov-
ered for personal injuries has been allowed to maintain a separate suit for
her husband's death caused by the same negligent act of the defendant.
Abilene Gas & Electric Co. v. Thomas, 211 S. W. 600 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919); Southern By. v. King, 160 Fed. 332 (C. C. A. 5th, 190S). Like-
-wise, several jurisdictions allow separate actions to be maintained by a
plaintiff who has suffered injury to his person and property by the same
negligent act. Ohs v. Public Service By., 81 N. J. L. 661, 80,Atl. 495
(1911); Reilly v. Sicillian Asphalt Pay. Co., 170 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772
(1902) ; Bordens Condensed Mill. Co. v. Mosley, 250 Fed. 839 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918); Brundson v. Hunzphrey, 14 Q. B. D. 141 (1884); see Note (1911)
24 HARv. L. REV. 492. Such decisions proceed legalistically upon the ground
that there are as many causes of action as there are rights infringed upon
by the wrongful act. On the other hand, a majority view regards the en-
tire factual situation between the parties, the wrongful act and its re-
sulting items of damage to person and property, as one entire cause of
action -which may not be split into several suits. Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Mat-
thews, 115 Tenn. 172, 91 S. W. 194 (1906); King v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
By., 80 Minn- 83, 82 N. W. 1113 (1900); Doran v. Cohen, 147 Mass. 342,
17 N. E. 647 (1888); Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa.
282, 117 AtI. 59 (1922); see Clark, The Code Causc of Action (1924) 33
YALE LAw JOURNAL 817, 827. In the instant case, the plaintiff has had his
day in court against the defendant, wherein their relations have been ad-
judicated. The court by adopting the broader viewpoint of the "cause of
action" -would seem to be in harmony with the tendency under the Codes
to avoid multiplicity of suits and vexatious litigation against defendants.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-DAMAGES ON FAILURE OF EQUITABLE CAUSE.-
The defendant constructed a fill on his property in such a way that sur-
face water caused lower ground to slide down upon the plaintiff's land.
The plaintiff obtained compensatory damages in equity as well as a manda-
tory injunction to remove the fill. Both parties admitted that there was
no danger of future slides. Held, on appeal, that the decree as to the in-
junction be reversed but that it be affirmed as tbo the damages. Gordon v.
Petty, 139 Atl. 914 (Pa. 1928).
Where actions at law and suits in equity are separate and distinct, if a
bill in equity on its face discloses no ground for equitable relief, it will be
dismissed. Farmers' Savings Bank v. Murphree, 200 Ala. 574, 76 So. 932
(1917); Allen v. Heft, 200 Mich. 593, 166 N. W. 854 (1918). Likewise
when the plaintiff has failed to prove the equitable cause alleged in the bill.
Milasinovich v. Milasinovich, 88 Pa. Super. 196 (1926); Fleming v. Re-
heis, 275 Ill. 132, 113 N. E. 923 (1916). Even though both parties request
a decision from the equity court. Welsh v. Hour, 136 At]. 327 (N. J. Eq.
1927). But purely legal relief has been given in spite of the failure of
proof of the equitable cause. Griffin v. Griffin, 206 Ala. 489, 90 So. 907
(1921). Where there is a single court but the practice act expressly pre-
serves the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity the suit
may be transferred to the law side of the court. Meeks 'V. Ark. Light &
Pr. Co., 147 Ark. 232, 227 S. W. 405 (1921). Less justification exists for
the confusion in other code states which do not perpetuate the distinction
between law and equity. In them, upon failure to prove the equitable
cause the action has been variously dealt with. The bill has been dis-
missed. Hawes v. Dobbs, 137 N. Y. 465, 33 N. E. 560 (1893); Schopp v.
Schopp, 162 Mo. App. 558, 142 S. W. 842 (1912). Or has been "trans-
ferred to the jury term." City of Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457, 138
N. E. 406 (1923).; Everett v. De Fontaine, 78 App. Div. 219, 79 N. Y. Supp.
692 (1st Dept. 1903); Ross Mine v. Cherokee Mining Go., 103 S. C. 243,
88 S. E. 8 (1916). The courts which award damages in this situation
seem to be more in accord with the spirit of the codifiers. Murtha v. Cur-
ley, 90 N. Y. 372 (1882); Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Martenstein, 167 Cal.
406, 139 Pac. 1060 (1914); McLennan v. Church, 163 Wis. 411, 158 N. W.
73 (1916); See Comment (1923). 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL 707. The reason
given for returning the case for retrial at law is that otherwise the parties
would be deprived of their constitutional right to a trial by jury. Brauor
v. Laughlin, 235 Ill. 265, 85 N. E. 283 (1908); City of Syracuse V. Hogan,
supra. This constitutional difficulty has been avoided by statutes, in code
and non-code states, providing that failure to demand a jury while the case
is in the pleading stage waives the right. Baxter v. Baxter, 217 N. W. 231
(Iowa, 1928); Hudson v. Goldberg, 262 Pac. 223 (Or. 1927). Cf. Conn.
Practice Bk. (1922) § 175. The instant case was decided under a statute
providing that jury trial is waived unless written demand is made but
this may be done at any time. Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §§ 17299, 17300.
Where the trial court awarded damages in lieu of requested equitable re-
lief, the appellate court has felt compelled to send back the case for trial
on the jury side. Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917).
The court in the instant case avoided such uneconomical procedure in the
analogous situation where equitable and legal relief were both granted
by the trial court but the appellate court found the former relief to have
been erroneously awarded. But cf. Farmers' Savings Bank v. Murphre,
supra.
PUBLIC OFFICERS-INJUNCTION To TEST VALmITY OF REDIovAL.-tUnder
the city charter, a board of commissioners was empowered to remove
1000
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plaintiff chief of police and fire marshal from office. There was a prob-
lem of construction, however, as to whether the charter required a hearing
and unanimous vote, or merely a majority. The plaintiff obtained an in-
junction to prevent his arbitrary removal by a majority. Held, on appeal,
that the injunction lbe vacated, on the ground that, although the form of
relief sought was proper, the board was acting entirely within the scope of
its authority. City of Electra v. Taylor, 297 S. W. 496 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927).
That a court of equity has no jurisdiction over the appointment and
removal of public officers has been frequently asserted. In re Sawyer, 124
U. S. 200, 8 Sup. Ct. 482 (1888); Walton v. House of Rcprezentatives, 265
U. S. 487, 44 Sup. Ct. 628 (1924); see Muhicr v. Hedekin, 119 Ind. 481,
485, 20 N. E. 700, 701 (1889). Various reasons have been assigned for
this rule, chief of which is the existence of an adequate remedy at law.
White v. Berry, 171 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 917 (1898) (federal employee
seeks to restrain dismissal because of political affiliations). Where the
title to office is contested, quo uvarranto is the proper action. Parsons v.
Durand, -150 Ind. 203, 49 N. E. 1047 (1898) (suit to enjoin recognition of
second mayor). When the officer has been actually ousted, mandamus, is
the appropriate remedy for reinstatement. Miles v,. Logan, 265 S. W. 421
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924). Certiorari may be brought to review proceedings
of the removing body. Chathamv . Davis, 183 Ill. App. 506 (1913) (revo-
cation of teacher's license) ; Throop, Public Offijers (1892) § 392. In the
case of teachers and public servants employed for a definite time at a fixed
compensation, action lies for breach of contract against the removing board.
Ryan v. Reddington, 240 Pa. 350, 87 At. 285 (1913); Greer v. Awstin, 40
Okla. 113, 136 Pac. 590 (1913). Another reason given for the general rule
is the non-concern of equity in matters of a political nature. Heffran v.
Hutchins, 160 Ill. 550, 43 N. E. 709 (1896) (fire chief sues to restrain al-
leged illegal removal by mayor); Note (1928) 13 CorN. L. Q. 287. And
some courts have resorted to the rule that equity will interfere to protect
only "property rights." Michels v. McCarty, 196 Ill. App. 493 (1915)
(chief of police denied injunction against usurpation of office by successor) ;
City of New York v. McAneny, 115 Misc. 433, 190 N. Y. Supp. 87 (Sup.
Ct. 1921) (injunction to prevent removal of transit commissioner. re-
fused). But when the question of title to office is not involved, and the
removing board is acting ultra vires, the office-holder has been granted
relief in the form of injunction to protect his incumbency. Stadhiut V.
Bauer, 51 Neb. 64, 70 N. W. 496 (1897) (injunction to prevent council from
removing mayor in excess of its authority); Rcccmlin v,. Mosby, 47 Ohio St.
570, 26 N. E. 717 (1890); Grigsby v. King, 260 Pac. 789 (Cal. 1927) (in-
junction against revocation of teacher's certificate). And a de facto officer
has obtained a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo until his
right to the office can otherwise be determined. G;illotte v. Pozcy, 41 La.
Ann. 333, 6 So. 507 (1889). The present decision affirms the propriety of
the use of injunctive relief to protect the office-holder and to test the ques-
tion as to whether the board has exceeded its powers. Lindley r. Davi.
117 Kan. 558, 231 Pac. 1026 (1925) (suit to enjoin removal of university
chancellor). This would seem in accord with the present tendency to ex-
tend the use of injunctions. Unless summary measures are provided by
legislation to enable public officers and employees to protect their positions
against arbitrary interference, equitable relief is an expedient and desir-




TORTS--NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARRIER TO PASSENGER ON STATION PLAT-
FORM.-A passenger, attempting to board a moving train, in which act he
was being assisted by the defendant's employees, dropped a package of fire-
works which exploded, causing scales on the station platform to fall on
the plaintiff, a passenger waiting on the platform. In an action for dam-
ages, the jury found the defendant's employees negligent in assisting the
passenger to board a moving train and in leaving the vestibule open.
Judgment was given for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal (two judges dis-
senting), that the judgment be affirmed, since the jury might well have
found that the defendant's agents, in assisting the plaintiff in his negligent
act, were also negligent. Palsgraf v. Long Iland R. R., 222 App. Div. 166,
225 N. Y. Supp. 412 (2d Dept. 1927).
To constitute a cause of action for negligence there must be a duty, a
violation of that duty, and a causal relation between such violation and the
harm suffered. Muncie Pulp Co. v. Davis, 162 Ind. 558, 70 N. E. 875
(1904); Koons v. Rook, 295 S. W. 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). The duty
must be owing to the person whose interest is harmed. Garland v. Boston
& M. R. R., 76 N. H. 556, 86 Atl. 141 (1913); Newark Electrio Light &
Power Co. v. Garden, 78 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 3d, 1896). Where the violation
of the duty consists in the breach of a statute, there is no responsibility
if the injury is not the result of the breach, or if those injured do not come
within the zone of apprehended danger. Boronkay v. Robinson & Carpen-
ter, 247 N. Y. 365, 160 N. E. 400 (1928); Di Caprio v. N. Y. C. R. R., 231
N. Y. 94, 131 N. E. 746 (1921); Franklin v. Houston Electric Co., 286 S.
W. 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). In these cases the principal question is
whether the statute was designed to protect the plaintiff against the par-
ticular hazard incurred. Sheldon v. Wichita Railroad & Light Co., 125
Kan. 476, 264 Pac. 732 (1928). Green, Causal Relation in Legal Liabil-
ity In Tort (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 513. The same problem exists
where the breach of duty consists in the violation of a common law rule.
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N, Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916);
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922). In the instant
case, the duty of closing the vestibule as well as the duty violated in at-
tempting to aid the passenger board the car, were doubtless for the latter's
benefit and not for the plaintiff's protection. Saunders v. Boston & M. R.
R., 136 Atl. 264 (N. H. 1927). It is possible, however, that such conduct
might subject a passenger in the plaintiff's position to unreasonable risks,
such as might result if a person attempting to board the car, or
his luggage, should fall upon the bystander. But even if such were
the case, the hazard here encountered was not of that character, hence
under no theory was there any violation of a duty owed the plaintiff.
Cf. Shelden v. Wichita Railroad & Light Co., supra; Wood v. Penn. R. R.,
177 Pa. 306, 35 Atl. 699 (1896). Causal relation was not an issue,
as it was clear that the defendant's conduct, whether a violation of its
duty or not, was a contributing factor to the plaintiff's hurt. Gilman v.
Noyes, 57 N. H. 627 (1876); Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1928),
c. 5.
WILLS-BEQUEST TO ACTIVE TRUST-INCRPORATION BY REFERENCE-
IDENTIFICATION OF BENEFICIARY BY NON-TESTAMIENTORY INSTRUMENT.-
During his life the testator had established an inter vivos trust for the
benefit of the wife and children of his only son, and to the fund thus
created he had added various securities from time to time. In his will the
testator made a bequest to his son a- trustee of that fund. Held, that the
bequest was valid, and that the trust agreement be referred to for the pur-
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pose of determining the identity of the ultimate beneficiaries. Swetland v.
Swetland, 140 Ati. 279 (N. *J. 1928).
The general 4merican rule is that an extraneous document may be in-
corporated in a will by reference thereto. But the will itself must refer
to the document as existing at the time the will is executed, and describe
it with sufficient accuracy to insure its identity. Newton v. Seaman's
Friend Soc., 130 Mass. 91 (1881); Skinncr v. American Bible Soc., 92 Wis.
209, 65 N. W. 1037 (1896). And the testator's intention to incorporate such
document into his will as a part thereof must be clearly evinced. Estate of
Young, 123 Cal. 337, 55 Pac. 1011 (1899). The instant trust agreement
-would seem to conform with all these requirements, since no attempt was
made by the testator to exercise his power to revoke the trust agreement.
But the doctrine of incorporation by reference has been repudiated in sev-
eral states. In re Acres' Will, 128 Misc. 254, 219 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Surr. CL
1926) ; Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 AtI. 1058 (1907). And its
status in New Jersey has been considered doubtfuL See Murray v. Lcwis,
94 N. J. Eq. 681, 684, 121 AtI. 525, 526 (1923) ; (1923) 33 Y,= LAW JoUn-
NAfl 335. A similar trust deed operating in praescnti was admitted to
probate as part of the will even though the testator had exercised his power
to make alterations in the trust gifts after the will was executed. Merrill V.
Boal, 47 R. I. 274, 132 AtI. 721 (1926). Contra: Atwood v,. R. I. Hospital
Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 1st, 1921). It is well recognized that an
instrument inter vivos may also operate as a will if executed with the neces-
sary formalities. Heaston v. K-eig, 167 Ind. 101, 77 N. E. 805 (1906);
Stewart v. Stewart, 177 Mass. 493, 59 N. E. 116 (1901) ; see cases collected
in 45 A. L. R. 843 (1926) annotation. But the bequest in Mcrrill v. Boal,
supra, might well have been sustained on the more accurate ground that the
agreement was a valid non-testamentary instrument which might be re-
ferred to in order to identify the beneficiaries. It has becn suggested that
where the will contains a general description of the beneficiaries, the com-
plete identification being reserved for determination by an e.xtrancous act,
evidence of such-act should be admissible where the act is executed for an
independent purpose, and not merely to complement the will. Evans, In-
corporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary Act (1925)
25 CoL. L. REv. 879. Thus the identification may be determined by subse-
quent events. Metcalf v. Sweeney, 17 R. L 213, 21 At]. 364 (1S91) (be-
quest to those in testator's employ at his death) ; Dennis v. Holsapple, 148
Ind. 297, 47 N. E. 631 (1897) (bequest to those caring for testatrix at her
death) ; Abbott v. Lewis, 77 N. H. 94, 88 Atl. 98 (1913) (gift to those in
testator's service for ten years prior to his death). And the will of another
may constitute such a non-testamentary act. Cf. In re Fowles, 222 N. Y.
222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918); Condit v. De Hart, 62 N. J. L. 78, 40 Atl. 776
(1898); Re Pifford, Ill N. Y. 410, 18 N. E. 718 (1888). The instant trust
agreement clearly comes within this test.
WILLs-EECUTION-ORDER OF SIGNING.-In the execution of a will, the
testator signed immediately after the witnesses. The complainant alleged
that the will was invalid on the ground of the order of signing and filed a
caveat to revoke its probate. A jury found for the will and the caveat was
accordingly dismissed. Held, on appeal from the caveat proceedings, that
the will was properly admitted to probate. Sellers v. Hayden, 140 At]. 56
(Md. 1928).
There is conflict on the question of the order of signing. 1 Page, Wills
(2d ed. 1926) § 353. The statutes on execution are sometimes thought to
require a chronological order of the acts involved. Laccy v. Dobbs, 63 N.
J. Eq. 325, 50 AtI. 497 (1901). But the necessity for conformance to the
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order at most is implied. See Slemmons v. Toland, 5 Ohio App. 201, 208
(1916). And the conflict is not thus explained, for it occurs under sub-
stantially identical, statutes. Cf. In re Silva's Estate, 169 Cal. 116, 145
Pac. 1015 (1915); Lacey v. Dobbs, supra. When courts construe at-
testation as the ability to testify to the facts of execution, and treat sub-
scription as a thing apart, merely for the purpose of subsequent identifica-
tion of the instrument, the order of signing, in the same transaction, is
unimportant. Swift v. Wiley, 1 B. Mon. 114 (Ky. 1840); In ro Hon's Es-
tate, 161 Mich. 20, 125 N. W. 696 (1910). But if the signature is regarded
as an integral part in attestation, the testator must sign before the wit-
nesses, in order that they may attest a past, and not a future, event.
Brooks v. Woodson, 87 Ga. 379, 13 S. E. 712 (1891), 14 L. R. A. 160 (1892)
annotation. This strict view has the merit of certainty, for it obviates
the possibility of change in testamentary capacity or intent, as well as the
determination of how long after the witnesses, the testator may validly
sign. See In re Karrer's Will, 63 Misc. 174, 177, 118 N. Y. Supp.
427, 423 (Surr. Ct. 1909). However, the requirement of a "continuous
transaction" would seem to do as much. See Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Grat. 1,
26 (Va. 1849). And there is said to be no substantial priority in acts sub-
stantially contemporaneous. See Kaufman v. Caughman, 49 S. C. 159,
166, 27 S. E. 16, 18 (1897). Thus the strict view would seem unwise in
that it defeats many bona fide wills on an unnecessary technicality. See
Harmening v. Harmening, 84 Ind. App. 459, 462, 150 N. E. 376, 377 (1926).
In the absence of evidence to the contrary or a requirement that the at-
testing witnesses see the testator sign, it is presumed that the testator signed
first. Nixon v. Sneelbaker, 155 Iowa 390, 136 N. W. 223 (1912); see
Kveton v. Keding, 286 S. W. 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (even though
witnesses testified they did not notice testator's signature). Contra: Tobin
v. Hoack, 79 Minn. 101, 81 N. W. 758 (1900) (when most of the will, in-
cluding the testator's signature, is concealed from the witnesses). And
only clear evidence will overcome this presumption. Flood v. KCerwin, 113
Wis. 673, 89 N. W. 845 (1902) (conflicting testimony insufficient).
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